How Sustainable are Benefits from Global Production Networks? Malaysia's Upgrading Prospects in the Electronics Industry by Dieter Ernst
The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center
in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera-
tion among the governments and peoples of the
Asia Pacific region including the United States.
Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern-
ment with additional support provided by private
agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and
Pacific governments.
East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for
comment and to inform interested colleagues about
work in progress at the Center.



































Dieter Ernst is a Senior Fellow and Theme Leader for eco-
nomic studies at the East-West Center. Dr. Ernst’s previous
affiliations include the OECD, Paris (as senior advisor), the
Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE),
and University of California at Berkeley (as research direc-
tor). Dr. Ernst co-chairs an advisory committee for the U.S.
Social Science Research Council to develop a new program
on Asia. He serves on the Committee on Information Tech-
nology and International Cooperation (ITIC) of the U.S.
Social Science Research Council and on the Committee
established by the Prime Minister’s Science Advisor to set
up a National Science Foundation for Malaysia. Dr. Ernst
has published numerous books and articles in leading jour-
nals on information technology, globalization, and econo-
mic growth. Recent books include  International Production
Networks in Asia: Rivalry or Riches?, and Technological
Capabilities and Export Success: Lessons from East Asia.
This paper is forthcoming in: "Global Production Networks
and Industrial Upgrading: Malaysia's Electronics Industry,"
in Kidd, J. and F.J. Richter (eds.), Trust and Anti-Trust in
Cross-Cultural Alliances, published for the World Economic
Forum, Palgrave, London.
East-West Center Working Papers: Economics Series reports
on research in progress. This paper has been peer-reviewed.
The views expressed are those of the author and not neces-
sarily those of the Center. Please direct orders and requests
to the East-West Center's Publication Sales Office. The
price for Working Papers is $3.00 each plus postage. To des-
tinations within the U.S. and its territories: for surface mail,
add $3.00 for the first paper plus $0.75 for each additional
title or copy sent in the same shipment; for airmail, add
$4.00 for the first paper plus $1.25 for each additional title or
copy sent in the same shipment. To destinations elsewhere:
for surface mail, add $6.00 for the first paper plus $1.50 for
each additional title or copy sent in the same shipment; for
airmail, add $7.50 for the first paper plus $3.50 for each




 “One of the most striking features of the 21
st century is that everything has become tradable”, 
John Plender, Going off the rails: global capital and the crisis of legitimacy, 2003 
 
“The world is more US-centric now than it has ever been”, Stephen Roach, chief economist of 
Morgan Stanley, at the World Economic Forum 2003 
 
“One of the important issues to be examined is whether and to what extent intraregional trade 
and investment linkages will work as a major factor of growth in the future”, 
Ivan Tselichtchev, in this volume 
 
Introduction 
A progressive integration of East Asia´s electronics industries into global 
production networks (GPNs) provides a fascinating example of the benefits that Asian 
firms can reap from linkages with foreign firms (e.g., Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 2000; 
Ernst, 1997a). Network participation has provided Asian producers with access to the 
industry’s main growth markets, helping to compensate for the initially small size of their 
domestic markets. It also provided new employment opportunities, and induced Asian 
network suppliers to develop primarily operational technological and management 
capabilities (Ernst and Kim, 2002). As a result, East Asia has emerged as the dominant 
global manufacturing base of the electronics industry, especially for assembly and 
component manufacturing. 
However, the 1997 financial crisis, as well as the downturn in the global 
electronics industry since late 2000 have brutally exposed the downside of export-led 
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industrialization: a country is more vulnerable, the more it is focused on assembly-
intensive mass production of commodity-type products, and the higher the share of these 
electronics products in its exports. This has given rise to an important debate that should 
inform the study of trust and anti-trust in cross-border corporate networks, especially 
those networks that include companies from Asian countries. Three questions are 
addressed in this debate:  
1.  Can earlier benefits from integration in GPNs be sustained?  
2.  Can these benefits be broadened to include improvements in learning, 
innovative capabilities and value-added?  
3.  What adjustments does this require in firm strategies and organization, and 
in related government policies?  
This chapter argues that an upgrading of East Asia’s electronics industry is an 
essential prerequisite for sustaining and broadening the benefits of integration into GPNs. 
Defined as a shift to higher value-added products, services and production stages through 
increasing specialization and efficient domestic and international linkages, industrial 
upgrading (IU) necessitates a strong domestic knowledge base. Successful upgrading 
raises daunting challenges, chief among them are substantial investments in long-term 
assets, such as specialized skills and innovative and research capabilities. In countries 
where the domestic industry structure provides only limited incentives for firms to invest 
in these long-term assets, upgrading prospects will remain limited.  
This, of course, implies that “winners and losers will emerge and differentiation 
will increase” (Tselichtchev, in this volume). Yet, globalization based on increasing 
inequality is hardly a realistic proposition, as it gives rise to anti-trust, if not violence and 
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wars. Conscious efforts are thus required to counter rising inequality. Business can 
contribute to these efforts. The keys to success are organizational innovations that help 
develop and disperse skills and capabilities ahead of what the market would provide. 
International knowledge sourcing through participation in GPNs, as well as through 
complementary linkages with foreign universities, consulting firms and through informal 
global peer group networks, can play an important catalytic role. These diverse 
international linkages can help Asian firms to bridge existing gaps in specialized skills 
and innovative capabilities; and they can facilitate changes in organization and 
procedures that are necessary to develop these capabilities locally. 
  It is difficult in one paper to consider the entire range of upgrading prospects 
through network participation that face the countries of East Asia. We focus on 
Malaysia
1, a mid-sized country that is confronted with a particularly demanding 
challenge, due to three peculiar characteristics of its electronics industry:  
First, Malaysia exceeds most other Asian electronics producers (with the exception of 
Singapore) in terms of its exposure to GPNs. Electronics constitutes around 60% of 
Malaysia’s exports. The electronics industry is the major recipient of FDI, absorbing 
more than one third of total manufacturing FDI between 1996-98 (MIDA, 1999)
2. And 
the US market absorbs 25% of Malaysia’s total exports (an estimated 40% for electronics 
exports). 
Second, with the Penang Development Center, with its two industrial master plans, and 
with the Bill of Guarantees (developed for its Multimedia Super Corridor) Malaysia has 
                                                           
1 For related studies on upgrading perspectives in Korea’s and Taiwan’s electronics industry, see Ernst, 
1994, 2000, and 2001. 
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developed one of the most aggressive sets of upgrading incentives for private companies 
(both foreign and domestic). And yet… 
Third, despite such policies, we find a mixed balance of benefits from network 
integration. On the positive side, Malaysia experienced, within a relatively short period, a 
substantial capacity and international market share expansion for electronics products. 
And until the mid-1990s, employment generation was significant, accompanied by 
considerable growth in productivity. Since then, however, productivity growth has 
slowed down, while lay-offs have considerably increased. Low-end assembly operations 
continue to dominate. Most importantly, Malaysia has failed to develop a sufficiently 
diversified and deep industrial structure, to induce a critical mass of corporate investment 
in specialized skills and innovative capabilities.  In short, Malaysia’s experience in the 
electronics industry indicates that nothing is automatic about benefits from participating 
in GPNs. 
    Section 1 in this chapter introduces an operational definition of industrial 
upgrading (IU).  Section 2 sketches key characteristics of GPNs and documents the 
emergence of complex, multi-tier “networks of networks” which provide new 
opportunities for IU, but which also raise threshold requirements for participating in 
these networks. In section 3, we highlight structural weaknesses of the Malaysian 
electronics industry that constrain its upgrading prospects; assess current policies that try 
to link cluster development and global network integration; and ask to what degree 
linkages with contract manufacturers (CMs) can broaden network benefits. Section 4 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Around 100 large foreign affiliates effectively dominate this industry. Their share in manufactured 
exports (most of it electronics), has increased sharply from 39.8% in 1985 to 68.3% in 1992 (Takeuchi, 
1997: p.9).  
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concludes, by exploring new opportunities for international knowledge sourcing that 
could complement Malaysia’s linkages with GPNs. 
1. Industrial Upgrading 
An appropriate long-term development strategy for Asian electronics industries 
must focus on improvements in specialization, productivity, and linkages (as defined by 
Hirschman, 1958, chapter 6), all of which necessitate a broad base of skills and 
innovative capabilities. All four elements are essential prerequisites for improving a 
country's capacity to raise long-term capital that is necessary for facility investment, 
R&D, and human resource development. The concept of industrial upgrading (IU) ties 
these four elements together (Ernst, 2003 d).  
Our definition emphasizes the importance of international linkages. We do not 
assume that IU ends at the national border, and that it occurs only if improved 
specialization generates pressures to create dense forward and backward linkages within 
the district or the national economy. A “closed economy” assumption is unrealistic. First, 
as globalization and information technology (IT) have drastically increased the 
international mobility of trade, investment, and even knowledge (Ernst, 2003a and b), 
this increases the scope for cross-border forward and backward linkages (Ernst, 2002 a 
and 2003 c).  
Second, most countries are constrained by a narrow domestic knowledge base and 
limited linkages. Both constraints are particularly important for Asian developing 
economies (e.g, Lall, 1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos, and Mytelka, 1998). With but few 
exceptions, highly heterogeneous economic structures constrain agglomeration 
economies; weak and unstable economic institutions obstruct learning efficiency; and a 
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high vulnerability to volatile global currency and financial markets constrain patient 
capital that is necessary for the development of a broad domestic knowledge base. As a 
result of this “vicious circle”, very limited sharing and pooling of resources and 
knowledge occurs within the country, and often even within the export-oriented cluster. 
To compensate for their narrow domestic knowledge base and limited linkages, Asian 
developing economies thus have to rely on foreign sources of knowledge to catalyze 
domestic capability formation. International linkages need to prepare the way for an 
upgrading of East Asia’s electronics industries. Integration into GPNs is one possible 
approach. 
2. Global Production Networks   
2.1. Characteristics 
Trade economists have recently discovered the importance of changes in the 
organization of international production as a determinant of trade patterns (e.g., Feenstra, 
1998; Jones and Kierzskowski, 2000; Navaretti, Haaland, Venables, 2002). Their work 
demonstrates that  
(i) Production is increasingly “fragmented” with parts of the production process 
being scattered across a number of countries, hence increasing share of trade in parts and 
components; and  
(ii) Countries and regions which have been able to become a part of the global 
production network are the ones which have industrialized the fastest.  
This chapter builds on this work, but uses a broader concept of GPNs that 
emphasizes four characteristics
3: i) scope: GPNs encompass all stages of the value chain, 
                                                           
3 For details, see Ernst, 1997, 2002a, 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c. 
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not just production; ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over network resources 
and decision-making; iii) knowledge diffusion: the sharing of knowledge is the necessary 
glue that keeps these networks growing; and iv) information systems: the increasing use 
of digital information systems to manage these networks enhances not only information 
exchange, but also provide new opportunities for the sharing and joint creation of 
knowledge. 
Vertical specialization has been a powerful driver of these networks (Ernst, 
2002b). A GPN covers both intra-firm and inter-firm transactions and forms of 
coordination: it links together the flagship’s own subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures 
with its subcontractors, suppliers, service providers, as well as partners in strategic 
alliances. A network flagship like IBM or Intel breaks down the value chain into a variety 
of discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be carried out most effectively, 
where they improve the firm’s access to resources and capabilities and where they are 
needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. The main purpose of 
these networks is to provide the flagship with quick and low-cost access to resources, 
capabilities and knowledge that are complementary to its core competencies. As the 
flagship integrates geographically dispersed production, customer and knowledge bases 
into GPNs, this may produce transaction cost savings. Yet, the real benefits result from 
the dissemination, exchange and outsourcing of knowledge and complementary 
capabilities. 
Knowledge sharing is the glue that keeps these networks growing. Flagships need 
to transfer technical and managerial knowledge to local suppliers. This is necessary to 
upgrade the suppliers’ technical and managerial skills, so that they can meet the technical 
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specifications of the flagships. Originally this involved primarily operational skills and 
routine procedures required for sales and distribution, manufacturing and logistics. Over 
time, knowledge sharing also incorporates higher-level, mostly tacit forms of 
“organizational knowledge” required for control, coordination, planning and decision-
making, as well as for learning and innovation. 
Flagships 
  While equity ownership is not essential, network governance is distinctively 
asymmetric. There is thus an inherent trend towards inequality that may constrain the 
building of trust. A GPN typically consists of various hierarchical layers, ranging from 
network flagships that dominate such networks, due to their capacity for system 
integration (Pavitt, 2002), down to a variety of usually smaller, local specialized network 
suppliers. The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and 
organizational leadership beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie 
directly under its management control (Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000). The strategy of the 
flagship company thus directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and network 
position of lower-end participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors. The 
latter, in turn, have no reciprocal influence over the flagship strategy. The flagship 
derives its strength from its control over critical resources and capabilities that facilitate 
innovation, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions and knowledge exchange 
between the different network nodes.  
Flagships retain in-house activities in which they have a particular strategic 
advantage; they outsource those in which they do not. It is important to emphasize the 
diversity of such outsourcing patterns. Some flagships focus on design, product 
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development and marketing, outsourcing volume manufacturing and related support 
services; other flagships even outsource a variety of high-end, knowledge-intensive 
support services. 
Asian suppliers 
To understand how sustainable benefits are from integration into GPNs, it is 
necessary to open the black box of “Asian suppliers” (Ernst, 2003e). First, some of these 
suppliers have been around for quite a while. Since the 1960s, various groups of Asian 
suppliers have emerged, first in consumer electronics, then as contract chip assemblers 
(Korea’s Anam as the most prominent example) and, more recently, in contract wafer 
fabrication (“silicon foundries”): or as ODM suppliers of computers and related 
equipment, IC design houses, and suppliers of PDA and wireless devices. Second, Asian 
suppliers obviously differ considerably in their capabilities, network position and market 
power. Substantial differences also exist with regard to their capacity for component 
sourcing, design & development and engineering, their capacity to provide global support 
services, and their use of digital information systems.  
Greatly simplifying, we distinguish two types of Asian suppliers: higher-tier and 
lower-tier suppliers. “Higher-tier” suppliers, like for instance Taiwan´s Acer group, play 
an intermediary role between global flagships and local suppliers. They deal directly with 
global flagships (both “brand leaders” and global US-based “contract manufacturers”); 
they possess valuable proprietary assets (including technology), which enables them to 
contract out the manufacturing of parts or final products based on their own design; they 
also provide knowledge support services to foreign firms; and they have developed their 
own mini-GPNs (e.g., Chen, 2002).   
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These higher-tier suppliers are now under pressure to develop complementary 
skills and capabilities in new product introduction (NPI), process re-engineering, as well 
as in “embedded” software, SOC (system-on-chip) design, IP trade, system integration, 
and become involved in the management of network resources, supply chains and 
customer relations. With the exception of hard-core R&D and strategic marketing that 
remain under the control of the global brand leader, Asian higher-tier suppliers must be 
able to shoulder all steps in the value chain. They must even take on the coordination 
functions necessary for global supply chain management. 
“Lower-tier” Asian suppliers are the weakest link in the GPNs. Their main 
competitive advantages are low cost and speed, and flexibility of delivery. Typically, 
they use dedicated parts supplied by a foreign firm, or contract manufacture parts or final 
products to the specifications of a foreign firm. These lower-tier suppliers are often used 
as “price breakers” and “capacity buffers”, and can be dropped at short notice. This 
second group of local suppliers rarely deals directly with the global flagships; they 
interact primarily with local higher-tier suppliers. Lower-tier suppliers normally lack 
proprietary assets, their financial resources are inadequate to invest in training and R&D 
and they are highly vulnerable to abrupt changes in markets and technology and to 
financial crises. 
2.3. Networks of Networks: Outsourcing Based on Contract Manufacturing
4 
To move this model a bit closer to reality, we distinguish two types of global 
flagships: i) “Original equipment manufacturers” (OEMs) who derive their market power 
from selling global brands, regardless of whether design and production is done in-house 
                                                           
4 Based on Ernst, 2003 e. 
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or outsourced; and ii) U.S.-based global “contract manufacturers” (CMs) who, over the 
last few years, have aggressively developed their own GPNs to provide integrated 
manufacturing and global supply chain services to the OEMs. 
This gave rise to an extremely rapid growth of the CM industry. From 1996 to 
2000, capital expenditures grew 11-fold (50% CAGR), and revenues increased by almost 
400% (81% CAGR). The industry’s rapid growth was driven primarily by M&A. 
Outsourcing based on contract manufacturing has created increasingly complex, multi-
tier “networks of networks” that juxtapose global ties among the two large global players 
(the OEMs and CMs), as well as intense regional ties with, mostly smaller, Asian firms
5.  
Sturgeon and Lester (2003) emphasize that the rise of U.S. contract manufacturers 
with global reach may pose a serious competitive threat to Asian suppliers in four areas: 
component sourcing; design, development and engineering (D&D&E); “global reach” 
which is the provision of support services across multiple locations in all major macro-
regions; and finally, “network coordination” giving improved network efficiencies 
through the use of sophisticated digital information systems. 
Our analysis leads us to a more or less optimistic perspective. It is important to 
emphasize the still limited share of US contract manufacturers in worldwide electronics 
hardware production. In 2001, this share was estimated to be around 13.7% (up from 
13.0% in 2000).  For 2002, this share is projected to increase to 16.3% (email from  Eric 
Miscoll, CEO, Technology Forecasters, Inc, April 15, 2002). Clearly, the US model of 
contract manufacturing is just one possible approach, and Asian electronics firms will 
                                                           
5 A focus on complex, multi-tier “networks of networks” distinguishes our analysis from Sturgeon’s 
modular production network model (2002). 
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continue to play an important role, based on their accumulated experience, in this form of 
contract manufacturing [before it was given that name] (Ernst, 1997).  
This learning process goes back to the early 1980s: well-documented milestones 
are Samsung’s contract with GE to act as its global contract manufacturer for microwave 
ovens (Magaziner and Patinkin, 1989); the spread of OEM (original equipment 
manufacturing) contracts from Korea’s consumer electronics industry to Taiwan’s 
computer industry and their gradual transformation into ODM (original design 
manufacturing) contracts (e.g., Ernst and O’Connor, 1992, chapter 4; Hobday, 1995; 
Ernst, 2000); and the market leadership by Asian, primarily Taiwanese, silicon foundries 
in contract wafer fabrication (Chen, 2002). Given this long history of contract 
manufacturing in Asia, there are ample opportunities to groom a variety of new 
specialized Asian suppliers, provided necessary changes are put in place in policies and 
support institutions. Let us now look at these efforts in Malaysia.  
 
3. Implications for Malaysia’s Upgrading Perspectives in the Electronics Industry 
A progressive integration into global production networks (GPNs) has been a 
primary driver of Malaysia’s success in the electronics industry. This integration started 
in the early 1970s with offshore chip assembly, primarily by US semiconductor firms. 
The next stage, since the early 1980s, was centered on Japanese electronics makers that 
moved their export platform production for consumer electronics to Malaysia and other 
Southeast Asian locations. Since the late 1980s, Malaysia was integrated into the 
production networks of American producers of computer-related equipment, as well as 
those established by their Taiwanese subcontractors. The most recent stage involves the 
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production of communication and networking equipment, and the acquisition of existing 
affiliates of global brand leaders (the so-called OEMs) by global contract manufacturers 
(CMs).  
The results have been impressive, in terms of production, exports, employment 
and investment. During the last decade, from 1990 to 2000, Malaysia’s electronics 
industry registered a CAGR of 23.5%. During the same period, exports grew at an annual 
average of 25.2%, while employment grew almost 11% annually until 1995 (figures 
courtesy of Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Kuala Lumpur). 
3.1. Structural Weaknesses 
Yet, despite these achievements, a shift in strategy is now overdue. Seven 
structural weaknesses of Malaysia’s electronics industry constrain its upgrading 
prospects (Ernst, 2003e): 
First, Malaysia’s integration into GPNs gave rise to the development of an 
asymmetric industry structure in which multiple layers of electronics firms are 
distinguished by unequal control over resources and decision-making. While Malaysian 
firms dominate in numbers, Malaysia’s electronics industry continues to be shaped by 
strategic decisions of global flagships (both OEMs and major American CMs). In 
hierarchical order, four types of firms can be distinguished: at the top of the industry 
pyramid are global OEMs and CMs; followed by suppliers and contract manufacturers 
from Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and Korea; higher-tier local suppliers; and, at the 
bottom, lower-tier local suppliers. 
Second, there is a heavy reliance on technological capabilities developed within 
affiliates of global flagships, and their eventual spill-overs into local firms. This 
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traditional pattern of network integration apparently produces decreasing benefits. A 
good proxy is the disturbing slow-down in productivity growth since 1995. In Penang, 
for instance, total factor productivity (TFP) of manufacturing declined by -0.5 % 
between 1995 and 1997, compared to an increase of 8.9% between 1990 to 1995 (State 
Government of Penang, 2001).  In the electronics industry, TFP growth fell to 2%  (from 
14.1% during the earlier period) - hardly sufficient for an industry that is supposed to be 
the engine of upgrading
6.  
Third, in contrast to countries like Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, Malaysia 
has failed to develop a broad and multi-tier base of support industries. The majority of 
the local suppliers possess few proprietary advantages and clearly qualify as “lower-tier” 
suppliers
7. The result is a lack of efficient domestic linkages and an inverted production 
pyramid -- a huge and rapidly growing final product sector that rests on a weak and much 
smaller domestic base of support industries.  
Fourth, a further consequence of Malaysia’s truncated industry structure is a 
persistently high import dependence stemming from rapid growth in the final products 
sector which necessitates considerable imports of intermediates and production 
equipment. By the late 1980s, the Malaysian electronics industry had to import almost 
43% of the intermediate goods that were required for the production of one unit of final 
output, far more than Korea (37%) and Japan (8.2%) (Takeuchi, 1997:7). Malaysia’s 
                                                           
6 As for TFP growth for all of Malaysia, most estimates put it around 1 to 2 % p.a. (until 2000). This is way 
below the minimum TFP growth projected by the government of 3.2% (for the period 2001 to 2010), 
which is necessary, if Malaysia wants to achieve the projected growth rate of 7.5%. Compared with 
historical growth patterns of productivity in industrialized countries, such a massive slow-down in TFP 
growth is certainly premature, in light of the thus far still limited progress in Malaysia’s specialization by 
product and production stage. 
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dependence on imports of electronics components, and especially semiconductors kept 
increasing during the 1990s, both as a share of electronics imports, and as a share of total 
merchandise imports
8.   
Fifth, a focus on low-end assembly operations for a handful of products adds 
further to the country’s vulnerability, as those operations can be easily replicated in 
countries with low labor costs.  
Sixth, of particular concern, is a declining capacity for employment generation.  
Following earlier downturns a substantial share of laid-off workers were re-hired, but this 
no longer seems to be the case
9. This shows that export-led electronics manufacturing is 
unlikely to act again as an engine of employment growth. 
Finally, an increasingly important weakness in Malaysia’s electronics industry is 
a serious mismatch between the demand and supply for skills. Despite the recession, job 
vacancies have kept increasing, with the biggest job openings in the “managerial and 
professional” categories in the electronics industry. This human resource bottleneck also 
has an important qualitative dimension. There is a widespread perception among 
electronics firms that local university graduates have book knowledge, but are ill-
equipped to deal with real world problems on the shop floor, and that they lack basic 
skills in communication, negotiation and presentation. This has led to the emergence of a 
bifurcated labor market, where the winners pick all the stakes - resulting in intense 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 There are of course a few widely quoted success cases, almost all of them located in Penang, such as 
BCM, Globetronics, Unico, LKT, and Eng Teknologi, that have successfully positioned themselves as 
higher-tier local suppliers for leading OEMs (e.g., Rasiah, 1995; Best, 2001). 
8 This suggests a fundamental mismatch of the country´s electronics exports and imports, with negative 
terms-of-trade implications: while imports involve high value-added core components, especially 
microprocessors and other ICs, Malaysia’s component exports overwhelmingly consist of low-value added 
final assemblies. 
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competition for those engineers and managers who either graduated from overseas 
universities or who have worked for a foreign firm.  
3.2. The Second Industrial Master Plan: Clusters and Global Network Integration 
  An important attempt to overcome the above weaknesses is the Second Industrial 
Master Plan (IMP2) (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1996). This document 
signals a fundamental change in Malaysia’s industrialization strategy, away from 
assembly-based “outward industrialization” to value chain-based manufacturing, from 
sector-based to cluster-based development, and from performance targets to productivity-
driven growth. The strategy is defined by two key concepts: “manufacturing ++” and 
“cluster-based development”. In line with Porter (1990), “manufacturing ++” highlights 
activities at both ends of the value chain, i.e. ‘R&D and engineering and in-bound 
logistics’ on the one hand and ‘outbound-logistics and sales & marketing’ on the other 
hand. It is argued that a move into knowledge-intensive support services like product 
development, process engineering, supply chain management, and some select areas of 
R&D will enhance local value-added and productivity. “Cluster-based development” 
implies that, based on existing strengths especially in components and semiconductors, 
developing a dense web of domestic linkages will enhance value-added and deepen 
domestic capabilities. The IMP2 highlights four specific objectives:  
i) foster the growth of “leading local companies (Malaysian brands);  
ii) reduce dependence on input imports;  
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 In Penang, almost two third of the retrenched workers in the electronics industry (ca. 16,000, primarily 
low-skilled, female production workers), have left the labor market, indicating a massive return of Malay 
females (in the 25-29 age range) to their villages (Too and Leng, 2002). 
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iii) strengthen agglomeration economies by developing “Integrated 
Manufacturing Centers” (IMC) for global network flagships;  
iv) develop cross-border clusters.  
Of these, the first two objectives are problematic, while the last two indicate a move in 
the right direction
10.  
Take recent developments in the Penang cluster where an attempt is made to 
combine the third and the fourth objectives of the IMP2. Rather than just giving in to 
requests for improved incentives by foreign companies, the state government pursues a 
more selective approach: incentives are explicitly linked with the promotion of 
“integrated manufacturing centers” (IMC). The goal is to induce global flagships to move 
to Penang an “entire chain of operations for a particular product”. It is expected that this 
should enable the Penang cluster to upgrade from mere assembly and testing to 
knowledge support services, like sales and marketing, adaptive process engineering and 
tooling, financial planning, and, eventually parts of R&D like design and development 
(D&D). 
3.3. Linkages with OEMs: Fragile Upgrading Prospects 
The outcome of policies to upgrade linkages with OEMs however depends on 
sector-specific developments that are beyond the control of a mid-sized country like 
Malaysia. The decisions, for instance, by Komag and Quantum, to relocate their entire 
                                                           
10 The first objective represents an outdated concept of IU that assumes a fixed sequencing pattern from 
low-end, assembly-type subcontracting to “original brand name” (OBM) manufacturing (for a typical 
example, see Hobday, 1995). We now know that the transition to OBM is extremely difficult - even 
Taiwan´s Acer group has had only limited success (Ernst, 2000). The limited achievements of the “Proton 
City cluster” in automobiles also indicate that this objective may be unrealistic. As for the second 
objective, much depends on whether the country succeeds in finding the right balance between reaping the 
benefits of foreign input imports (as described in Rodrik, 1999) and the development of local backward 
and forward linkages.  
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U.S. manufacturing operations to Penang, primarily reflects the relentless pressure within 
the hard disk drive industry to move volume manufacturing and support services to 
locations having close proximity to Singapore which is the dominant global cluster center 
for these activities (Ernst, 1997).  
A major constraint to the building of trust is that much of Malaysia’s inward FDI 
remains highly “footloose” and prone to sudden relocation decisions to lower-cost 
locations. Equally important is that global flagships that are forced to downsize to retain 
shareholder value in a recession are inclined to cut first the employment in export 
platform locations, which reflect their flexible labor market regulations. These 
developments are hardly conducive for fostering trust between Malaysian and foreign 
firms.  Take two prominent examples. For instance, Quantum’s decision in 2001 to move 
to Penang its entire manufacturing line for digital linear tape storage devices was very 
short-lived. One year later, in the summer of 2002, Jabil, the global contract 
manufacturer, was about to acquire Quantum’s tape drive manufacturing activities as 
well as two low-end products of the tape automation product division (author’s 
interviews in Malaysia, July 2002) 
Or take the recent decision by Dell to relocate its desktop production for the 
Japanese market from Penang to Xiamen, China, and to assign Xiamen to be the 
exclusive supply base for Dell´s complete Chinese product line - while Dell’s two 
plants in Penang remain the BTO shipment hub for the rest of its Asia-Pacific market 
(with the exception of desktops).  This constitutes a major blow for Malaysia.  While 
immediate job losses are only 60 (out of a total of 2000), this move to China indicates 
that more such redeployments may be in the offing. Dell gives three reasons for its 
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decision to redeploy to China: good and low-cost Chinese engineers; cheap land; and the 
too limited number of flight connections between Malaysia and Japan. This further 
indicates the unpredictability and fragility of Malaysia’s GPN-induced upgrading 
prospects.  
Even so, linkages to OEMs also provide important new upgrading opportunities. 
Take the attempts to promote the adoption of Rosetta Net e-business standards
11 to 
improve the network integration of Malaysian suppliers. The idea is to involve major 
global network flagships that are already on the RosettaNet, such as Cisco, Dell, 
Quantum, Siemens, Solectron, Intel, AMD, Hitachi, Agilent, and Motorola.  These 
flagships could then be used to pressure and cajole their local suppliers to upgrade their 
IT infrastructure so that these local suppliers become eligible for the above grants. It is 
however an open question of how the substantial constraints that prevent smaller lower-
tier suppliers can be overcome for them to adopt the RosettaNet standards
12. 
3.4. Developing Multiple Linkages with Contract Manufacturers 
To what degree can linkages with contract manufacturers (CM) broaden 
Malaysia’s upgrading prospects? Three developments are important: the arrival of major 
                                                           
11 RosettaNet is a global consortium of over 400 of the world’s leading OEMs and CMs for electronic 
components, semiconductors, computers and telecommunications equipment, working to create, implement 
and promote open e-business process standards. Malaysia is the fifth country in Asia to join RosettaNet, 
after Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
12 Participation in the definition of the RosettaNet standards is probably the more immediate benefit. Six 
Malaysian electronics engineers, on loan to RosettaNet for two years, will work for six months at the 
California-based RosettaNet headquarters alongside American engineers to define XML-based 
specifications for the global electronics industry. The companies that provide these Malaysian engineers 
include global flagships (Intel and Microsoft), leading local suppliers (BCM Electronics, Globetronics 
Multimedia Technology), and two employees of MIMOS (= Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics 
Systems), a web developer and a public key infrastructure developer. Obviously, these six Malaysian 
engineers will play an important role as multipliers and upgrading catalysts, once they return from their US 
mission. They will also act as gatekeepers for these more knowledge-intensive linkages with global 
flagships. 
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US CMs; the mutation of component suppliers from Japan and Taiwan into contract 
manufacturers; and upgrading efforts of Malaysian higher-tier suppliers. 
a. Arrival of major US CMs 
 All the main US CMs are now present in the Northern Penang/Kulim Hi-Tech 
cluster, or in the southern Johor/Singapor cluster
13. Thus far, this has created only limited 
upgrading opportunities, insufficient for a major push into more knowledge-intensive 
activities (Ernst, 2003e). The main benefits are an increasing sophistication in assembly 
technologies (especially multi-tier SMT, used for PCBA), and the provision of support 
services related to manufacturing, with the exception of asset and logistics 
management
14. The purpose of these services is to provide manufacturing solutions that 
enable a quick ramping-up of volume manufacturing.  
Overwhelmingly, global CM players keep design (and especially circuit, 
advanced optical and systems design) concentrated in the US and Europe. One would of 
course expect such a disparity in design and product development, due to their high 
knowledge-intensity. This however is now beginning to change, as Taiwanese contract 
manufacturers are aggressively expanding their design-based ODM services 
15.  
b. Component suppliers from Japan and Taiwan  
                                                           
13 Solectron is present in Penang, Johor and Singapore; Flextronics in Singapore and Johor; Sanmina/SCI 
in Penang, and Singapore; Celestica in Kedah`s Kulin Hi-tech Park; and Jabil Circuit in Penang. There are 
also a few important investments elsewhere in the region, such as Malaysia`s Kuching/Sarawak 
(Sanmina/SCI), Thailand (Flextronics, Sanmina/SCI and Celestica), and Indonesia (Celestica).  
14 Typically, this also includes electrical and mechanical design services, global test services, printed circuit 
board layout services and detailed process engineering (“advanced manufacturing technology research” in 
CM industry parlance). 
15 Increasingly, certain types of electronic design, including SOC (system-on-chip) design, have been 
relocated to some of the leading IT clusters in the Asia-Pacific region that provide a skilled and re-trainable 
workforce as well as easy access to foundry, assembly and testing services. Design first moved to Taiwan 
and Korea, but now is moving also to China and India, as well as to Singapore and  Malaysia (Ernst, 
2003f) 
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A second important development in fact predates the arrival of American contract 
manufacturers that has absorbed most public attention. Both the parts and the component 
suppliers from Japan and Taiwan, whose arrival in Malaysia goes back to the second part 
of the 1980s, have acted as catalysts for the development of Malaysia’s local support 
industries (e.g., Takeuchi, 1993, and Ernst, 1997). Generally the Japanese component 
manufacturers have been concentrated primarily in the consumer electronics sector, 
although some of them, however, have also branched out into the computer sector.  
Taiwanese firms have played an important role in Malaysia’s computer industry 
since the late 1980s. Over time, their Malaysian affiliates have upgraded from simple 
volume manufacturing, according to designs owned by the global flagships, and to more 
sophisticated contract-manufacturing services for leading computer network flagships. 
Large Taiwanese contract manufacturers have pioneered the use of original design for 
manufacturing (known as ODM) capabilities in Asia. This may provide upgrading 
opportunities for Malaysian firms that interact with affiliates of these Taiwanese contract 
manufacturers. 
c) Upgrading Efforts of Malaysian Higher-tier Suppliers 
Leading higher-tier local suppliers understand that they need move up within the 
hierarchy of contract manufacturing arrangements, from low-end box build, and 
consignment arrangements, to ODM provision, and then to total solutions provider 
(author’s interviews in Malaysia, July 2002). They are however facing major problems in 
sustaining and expanding their upgrading efforts. They all face the demanding challenge 
of pursuing simultaneously the following five upgrading strategies, each of which 
requires major investments: 
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•  to establish themselves with a credible position as low-cost niche contract 
manufacturers (CMs) 
•  to develop global presence through overseas FDI 
•  to develop diversification and market segmentation, 
•  to develop knowledge-intensive support services, 
•  to invest in design and R&D. 
The implementation of these upgrading options requires the development of a 
broad and diverse set of capabilities. It is important to emphasize the systemic nature of 
the required capabilities
16. Take manufacturing services. The move from PCBA and box 
build to test necessitates the development not only of testing capabilities (which are 
scarce), but also of system engineering and maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, 
developing design & engineering capabilities requires substantial funds for R&D.  Or 
take after-ship services. A seemingly mundane activity like repair requires the training of 
technicians in failure analysis, while end-life program management requires capable 
supply chain managers. As for the upgrading of procurement and outbound logistics, 
substantial funds are required for the gradual upgrading of the necessary information 
systems.  
The successful upgrading of Malaysian higher-tier suppliers requires fundamental 
changes in industry organization, i.e. a transition toward flexible domestic supplier 
networks that can complement the capabilities of individual Malaysian suppliers. Second, 
the quality of human resources needs to be improved, through a constant process of re-
                                                           
16 LC1, one of the most successful local companies, for instance attempts to build on existing strengths in 
contract manufacturing and the provision of ODM services, to become a lower-cost  “total solution 
provider” for carefully chosen niche markets. To do this with low overheads requires strong capabilities in 
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skilling and re-learning. And, third, international knowledge sourcing is required to 
bridge existing gaps in specialized skills and innovative capabilities, and to facilitate 
changes in organization and procedures that are necessary to develop these capabilities 
locally.  
4. New Opportunities: International Knowledge Sourcing 
4.1. The MSC concept  
A widely known attempt to address this issue is the government’s initiative to 
establish a $40 billion Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) that was supposed to leapfrog 
the country into fully developed nation status by the year 2020 (Multimedia Development 
Corporation, 2002). In 1996, the government had hired McKinsey, the global consulting 
firm, to draft a blueprint for a 15-kilometer-by-50-kilometer strip intended to be 
Malaysia’s answer to Silicon Valley. An unprecedented set of incentives, enshrined in the 
Bill of Guarantees, were offered to companies involved in the creation, distribution, 
integration or application of multimedia products and services within the MSC
17.  
$3.7 billion have been spent thus far, but results are disappointing. A leaked 
confidential report by the very same company that designed the project (McKinsey) 
concluded in February 2001 that the Multimedia Super Corridor “ had not attracted much 
                                                                                                                                                                             
six highly interdependent functions: manufacturing, quality, materials, procurement, engineering and 
human resources. 
17 According to the Multimedia Development Corporation (2002), these incentives include commitments 
“to provide a world-class physical and information infrastructure; to allow unrestricted employment of 
local and foreign knowledge workers; to ensure freedom of ownership by exempting companies with MSC 
Status from local ownership requirements; to give the freedom to source capital globally for MSC 
infrastructure, and the right to borrow funds globally; to provide competitive financial incentives, including 
Pioneer Status (100 percent tax exemption) for up to ten years, or an investment tax allowance for up to 
five years, and no duties on the importation of multimedia equipment; to become a regional leader in 
Intellectual Property Protection and Cyberlaws; to ensure no censorship on the Internet; to provide globally 
competitive telecommunications tariffs; to tender key infrastructure contracts to leading companies willing 
to use the MSC as their regional hub; and to provide a high-powered implementation agency to act as an 
effective one-stop super shop.” 
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interest from global investors, nor made an impact on the domestic economy.” (Prystay, 
2001). There is a growing recognition that lavish tax incentives and massive investment 
in infrastructure are insufficient to bring about the development of dynamic clusters. 
Recent strategic documents emphasize that the key to success are incessant efforts on a 
massive scale to continuously upgrade existing skills and capabilities, and to extend them 
into new areas like photonics, embedded software and chip design (National Information 
Technology Council, 2002). 
The following major priority areas for reducing the skills mismatch in the 
Malaysian electronics industry were identified during recent interviews with government 
agencies and leading companies (June/July 2002):  
1. A massive re-skilling and re-training of production workers; 
2. An increase in the number of graduates, especially for EEE, IT, and circuit 
design who are able to combine hardware, software, and application knowledge;  
3. Find experienced managers, especially for strategic marketing, and upgrade 
management in general, and the management of international linkages;  
4. Find entrepreneurs that combine street-wise commercial and financial instincts 
with analytic capacity for strategic decision-making;  
5. Find experienced and industry-savvy administrators who are willing to stick 
out their necks and to do more than just follow the rules (this of course requires some 
incentive alignment);  
6. Create incentive alignments for university professors and academics that 
encourage close interaction with private sector (company internships and sabbaticals);  
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7. Support intense interactions with expatriate nationals who are based in the US, 
Australia and Europe, or elsewhere in Asia; 
8. Create a capacity to bring in at short notice specialized experts from overseas 
who can help bridge existing knowledge gaps and who can catalyze necessary changes in 
organization and procedures.   
4.2. Diversifying international linkages 
Malaysia should also exploit new opportunities for diversifying international 
linkages that can complement its integration into GPNs. First, the country needs to 
strengthen linkages with overseas universities that can help to upgrade research, 
development and design capabilities in Malaysian universities and public labs. The focus 
thus far has been on a handful of global elite institutions that bring in their standard, 
routine IT and business courses at very high cost. Instead, collaboration should focus on 
specific niche areas, in line with Malaysia’s needs (e.g., chip design, embedded software, 
and photonics). The search should move beyond the exclusive ranks of the “Ivy League” 
universities: there is an ample choice of smaller, less well-known universities and 
research institutes that are more than willing to develop innovative courses that are 
customized to the specific needs and capabilities of Malaysia’s electronics clusters.  
Second, Malaysia should also reconsider its linkages with consulting firms. For 
information technology, the market is overwhelmingly dominated by a handful of giant 
corporations like IBM and consulting firms like Accenture that grew out of global 
accounting firms. These firms thrive on the economies of scale of knowledge sharing 
(called “network economies” by information economists). However, as flagships of 
global information service networks, these firms provide only a standard product 
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wherever they go, and customization is possible only within certain limits within the 
standard solution package. This approach to customization is extremely costly: customers 
are charged for the time required to adjust the standard IT package and for effective 
implementation.  And these costs are inflated by massive delays. The result is that new 
systems often come in late, over budget and unable to solve problems they were meant to 
address. This has created a demand for smaller, specialized niche players from Asia who 
do not start from standard solution packages and who offer clients fixed-price projects.  
Third,  Malaysia also needs to tap into an increasingly important carrier of 
international knowledge diffusion: “transnational technical communities” (Saxenian, 
2002) of technically skilled immigrants with business experience and connections in the 
US, Europe and Japan that play an important and complementary role to network 
flagships in global production networks. By linking their home countries with the world’s 
centers of information and communication technology (Silicon Valley, as well as other 
centers of excellence in less well known places like Helsinki, Kista/Stockholm, Grenoble, 
Munich, Tsukuba, Tel Aviv, etc) these informal social networks transform what used to 
be a one-way “brain drain” into a two-way process of “brain circulation”. These networks 
could channel invaluable knowledge on global markets and technology trends to 
Malaysian electronics firms, complementing their linkages with global flagships. They 
also provide entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that can function well in both worlds.  
In Malaysia, the Penang cluster has obviously benefited from students who have 
studied engineering and management overseas, whether in Singapore, Australia, Japan, 
the UK and the US, and who have returned with business experience and connections. 
Predominantly, these connections have been with global flagships like Intel and Motorola 
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in semiconductors, or Matsushita and other Japanese flagships in consumer electronics. 
Overwhelmingly, the technology, skills, and knowledge generated by these immigrant 
engineers has focused on manufacturing-related activities. It is time now for Malaysia to 
adjust this “brain circulation” to encompass new areas like knowledge-intensive support 
services, software, circuit design and chip packaging. In short, international knowledge 
sourcing holds great promise as a necessary complement to integration into GPNs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on operational definitions of industrial upgrading (IU) and global 
production networks (GPNs), this chapter has explored how Asian firms can benefit from 
inter-relations within these networks and through other forms of international knowledge 
exchange. Inherent in the hierarchical structure of flagship-dominated GPNs is a trend 
towards increasing inequality that may foster anti-trust, and hence erode possible benefits 
from globalization.  
Focusing on Malaysia’s electronics industry, we address three questions that are 
central to the study of trust and anti-trust in cross-border corporate networks:  
1. Under what conditions can benefits from integration  in GPNs be 
sustained?  
2.  Can these benefits be broadened to include improvements in learning, 
innovative capabilities and value-added?  
3.  What adjustments does this require in firm strategies and organization, and 
in related government policies?  
We have documented that linkages with foreign firms through integration into GPNs  
provides new opportunities for upgrading Malaysia’s electronics industry, but realizing 
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this potential has also become more difficult for mid-sized countries like Malaysia. The 
best choice arguably is to move forward in incremental steps, and to build on existing 
strengths in assembly and volume manufacturing, by adding knowledge-intensive support 
services. Of critical importance is the absorptive capacity of the local suppliers, i.e. their 
resources, capabilities and motivations. To stay on the GPNs, local suppliers must 
constantly upgrade their absorptive capacity by investing in their skills and knowledge 
base.  
Adequate incentives are required to generate sufficient investments in the 
development of skills and capabilities (as illustrated for instance by the Nordic countries 
in Europe, and by Taiwan, and Singapore). Successful IU within GPNs requires support 
policies for local firms through local supplier development, (co-funded) skill 
development, standards setting, and the provision of investment and innovation finance 
through a variety of sources and mechanisms, including venture capital, and IPOs. 
Equally important are attempts to strengthen the country’s innovative capabilities 
through selective international knowledge sourcing. As an immediate policy instrument, 
it is advisable to import missing critical skills from overseas. This could help to catalyze 
necessary reforms in the domestic innovation system.  
Of critical importance for Malaysia’s upgrading prospects in the electronics 
industry are new opportunities to tap into international flows of human capital and 
knowledge through informal peer group networks of technically skilled immigrants with 
business experience and connections in the US, Europe and Japan. These international 
social networks can play an important and complementary role as carriers of knowledge 
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and capital to Malaysian firms that help sustain and expand benefits from integration into 
GPNs. 
However, successful international knowledge sourcing necessitates a much 
stronger basis for mutual trust than appears to exist in the current hostile international 
environment. Tough new visa policies, introduced in the US, as well as in Europe and 
Japan, as part of the “war on terrorism”, are beginning to stifle the mobility of 
knowledge, by constraining the movements of scientists, engineers, managers and 
students from countries like Malaysia. The damage caused to building trust in cross-
border alliances is aptly summarized by Bill Reinsch, a former undersecretary of 
commerce in the Clinton administration: “One of our secret weapons has always been 
bringing people here to see what America is like. The ones that stay enrich our society 
and the ones that go back enrich their societies because they take our values with them. 
We’re throwing all that away. The long-term consequences of this are horrible.” 
(Financial Times, January 29, 2003: 11) 
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